In this paper we emphasize the importance of unique certified one-time key pairs in Buyer-Seller Watermarking (BSW) protocols. We distinguish between reactive unbinding attacks, in which the seller reacts to illicit file sharing by fabricating further evidence of such activity, and pre-emptive unbinding attacks, in which the seller gains an advantage by taking action that pre-empts the file being shared. We demonstrate the importance of certified one-time key pairs in the BSW protocol by Lei et al., for protecting against pre-emptive unbinding attacks, and subsequently reveal a new attack on a recently published BSW protocol due to its omission of unique key pairs.
INTRODUCTION
Copy deterrence mechanisms discourage illicit duplication and dissemination of copyrighted material by embedding an imperceptible identifying mark within content to trace any illicit file sharing back to the original owner (?).
However, the buyer must be assured that the copyright owner has proof if and only if an illegal act has taken place. The assurance that evidence cannot be fabricated against a buyer is known in the literature as customers' rights (?).
Qiao and Nahrstedt observed that previous schemes, in which the seller chose the watermark, failed to protect the copyright. Even if a seller had acted honestly, and is convinced of the buyer's illegal activity, the seller remains unable to prove that it was not they that had leaked the watermarked content.
Memon and Wong proposed a Buyer-Seller Watermarking (BSW) protocol that aimed to resolve this customers' rights issue by withholding knowledge of the watermark or watermarked content from the seller (?). However, Lei et al. later uncovered an issue present in the Memon-Wong (MW) protocol that they termed the unbinding problem (?). They subsequently proposed their own protocol, their approach to prevent unbinding was twofold: bind a watermark to content using some signed message; and use onetime key pairs to avoid outdated information being * The authors' work is sponsored by an EPSRC Thales CASE Award. used in subsequent transactions.
In this paper we distinguish between two forms of unbinding, reactive and pre-emptive, and emphasise the importance of one-time key pairs in preventing the latter of these.
In Section ?? we provide background material on the MW protocol and the unbinding problem presented by Lei et al. and then distinguish between two forms of unbinding in Section ??. The importance of one-time key pairs is demonstrated in Section ??, subsequently a pre-emptive unbinding attack on a recently published protocol is presented in Section ??. Finally we discuss the danger in entrusting buyer's to randomly generate key pairs in Section ?? before drawing conclusions in Section ??. The Appendix provides a summary of the notation used throughout this paper.
THE UNBINDING PROBLEM
In this section we describe the protocol proposed in (?) and the associated unbinding problem presented in (?).
The approach taken in (?) to resolve the customers' rights issue, was to restrict the seller to conduct the watermark embedding in the encrypted domain, using the properties of homomorphic encryption. Knowledge of the watermark and watermarked content are withheld from the seller during embedding and thus the buyer cannot claim that a copy was released by the seller.
During the watermark generation phase of the protocol, the buyer receives encrypted watermarks from a trusted third party, signed to certify they are well-formed. The third party need not be involved in transactions between the buyer and seller thus he is said to be offline (?). Furthermore, the third party is not required to store any data.
In the watermark insertion phase of the protocol, the buyer initiates a transaction sending to the seller some encrypted watermark, S sk t (E pk b (w)), generated and signed by a trusted third party during the watermark generation phase. The seller must also receive an indication of what cover material the buyer wishes to purchase, arg(c), and certification of the buyer's public key. The encrypted watermark signed by the certification authority is also sent to the seller.
As the seller is now in possession of the encrypted watermark E pk b (w) and can calculate the encrypted content E pk b (c), they construct the encrypted digital content E pk b (W wk s (c, w)) by performing the embedding in the encrypted domain 2 . The seller produces E pk b (W wk s (c, w)) without ever knowing the watermark or the watermarked content in the clear.
It should be possible, once an illicitly shared file is intercepted by the seller, for the original owner to be traced and this proven to an arbitrator. The protocol relies on the buyer participating in the arbitration process, however if a buyer refuses to do so it is considered admission of guilt.
The protocol was shown to be flawed in (?). Lei et al. presented an unbinding problem apparent once the user has illicitly shared content. Should a single file be shared by a buyer, the seller may react by embedding this watermark into any other content in order to fabricate evidence of further illicit file sharing against the buyer.
Upon completion of a transaction in which they purchase the content C 1 with watermark W , the buyer B receives the encrypted watermarked content E pk B (W wk S (C 1 ,W )). Should B upload the decrypted content W wk S (C 1 ,W ) onto some file sharing network the seller S may later download the content and extract W in order to trace the piracy back to B. However, once S has extracted W they may embed it within some other content C 2 to produce W wk S (C 2 ,W ). Thus the evidence of illicit file sharing of C 2 (i.e., W wk S (C 2 ,W ) and S sk T (E pk B (W ))) can be obtained by S at a time when C 2 has not been shared. 2 An indexing watermark v is first embedded to avoid an exhaustive search being performed. A permutation function σ is then applied whilst embedding the watermark c in the encrypted domain such that the buyer cannot know the signal embedded.
REACTIVE AND PRE-EMPTIVE UNBINDING
Lei et al. also describe another form of unbinding attack in which the seller gains an advantage by taking action that pre-empts a file being shared. Upon completing a transaction in which they purchase the content C 1 with watermark W 1 , the buyer B receives the encrypted watermarked content E pk B (W wk S (C 1 ,W 1 )). However, during a second transaction, in which B wishes to purchase the content C 2 with watermark W 2 , the seller S may choose to distribute the encrypted watermarked content E pk B (W wk S (C 2 ,W 1 )) to B. Should B ever share the latter content then S may extract the watermark W 1 and embed it within the content C 1 . Thus the evidence of illicit file sharing of C 1 (i.e., W wk S (C 1 ,W 1 ) and S sk T (E pk B (W 1 ))) can be obtained by S at a time when C 1 has not been shared.
In the first attack scenario, described in Section ??, the malicious seller reacts to the file sharing maliciously by subsequently extracting the watermark from the shared file and embedding it within another. This is only possible after the file sharing event has occurred. In this paper we shall refer to such an unbinding attack as Reactive Unbinding. This is as opposed to what we shall refer to as Pre-emptive Unbinding in which the seller gains an advantage by taking action that pre-empts the file being shared. The two attacks are only subtly different in the MW protocol, but we shall see that Lei et al. adopt different mechanisms to prevent each of the two forms of unbinding.
THE IMPORTANCE OF ONE-TIME KEY PAIRS
The approach taken in (?) to prevent unbinding, as illustrated in Figure ? ?, was twofold: bind a watermark to content using some signed message; and use one-time key pairs to avoid outdated information being used in subsequent transactions. The one-time key pairs were proposed as a mechanism to prevent pre-emptive unbinding, although other papers refer to them as anonymous keys such as (?), (?) and (?). It is out of the scope of this paper to consider anonymity; instead we will demonstrate the importance of one-time key pairs for the overall security of the scheme. Figure ? ? illustrates the LYTC protocol. The trusted third party is online during each run of the protocol, generating a unique watermark for each transaction. The buyer initiates the protocol by sending S sk b * (arg(c)) to the seller, indicating the content they wish to receive. An anonymous certificate, signed by a certification authority, is sent from the buyer to the seller to certify the buyer's public key, C sk ca (pk b ), although a standard digital certificate may be used if privacy is not a concern.
Lei-Yu-Tsai-Chan (LYTC) Protocol
The buyer constructs a one-time public-secret key pair (pk b * , sk b * ) as the unique key pair used during the current transaction. This ensures that outdated information cannot be used in subsequent transactions and thus prevents pre-emptive unbinding. The buyer certifies the public key by constructing a second digital certificate C sk b (pk b * ). The key pk b * is immediately used to verify the signed agreement sent by the buyer.
Upon verification of the signed agreement, the seller forwards C sk b (b * , pk b * ) and E sk b * (arg(c)) to the third party. In order to ensure the watermark is suitably robust the seller also sends some characteristics char(c) of the cover material 3 .
The trusted third party then constructs a robust watermark that is unique to this transaction. They use the public key received in the digital certificate C sk b (pk b * ) to encrypt the watermark ready for use by 3 Lei et al. state that the seller may send the content c if unconcerned about doing so. Evidence of illicit file sharing can be fabricated by any agent in possession of the cover material and watermark. Hence, the third party must not know the cover material as they choose the watermark. the seller. It is sent along with the public key used to encrypt it and bound to the signed agreement by the trusted third party by signing a message constructed of all three components. It is this message that prevents reactive unbinding. They also encrypt the watermark under their own secret key in case they need to verify the watermark in the arbitration process.
Finally, the seller constructs the watermarked content in the encrypted domain. Once the buyer has received the encrypted, watermarked content they are able to decrypt in order to gain the useful watermarked content that they wished to purchase.
Omitting One-time Key Pairs
By binding the watermark to the cover material via the signed message S sk t (E pk b * (w), pk b * , S sk b * (arg)), Lei et al. prevent the malicious seller from performing a reactive unbinding attack. However, this message alone does not protect against pre-emptive unbinding.
Let us suppose that the key pair need not be unique, then a buyer B may use the same key pair (pk B * , sk B * ) in multiple transactions. Consider the first piece of content C + purchased as more expensive than a second piece of content C − . In the first transaction the seller S receives the signed message S sk T (E pk B * (W ), pk B * , S sk B * (arg(C + ))) before distributing the encrypted watermarked content E pk B * (W wk S (C + ,W )) to B.
Subsequently in a second run of the protocol B purchases C − using the same key pk B * . As such, S omits the communication with the trusted third party T and instead embeds the same encrypted watermark E pk B * (W ) as in the first transaction.
Should S ever intercept an illicitly shared copy of the less expensive watermarked content W wk S (C − ,W ) then W can be extracted and embedded into the higher priced content to produce W wk S (C + ,W ). This, along with the signed message received signed message from the first transaction S sk T (E pk B * (W ), pk B * , S sk B * (arg(C + ))), is then considered sufficient evidence of illicit file sharing of the more expensive content, when in fact the less expensive watermarked content was illicitly shared.
Should the encryption key pk B * be unique to each transaction then it is not possible for the seller to perform the watermark embedding using an outdated encrypted watermark associated with a previous transaction. Hence, the uniqueness of the one-time key pairs must be assured for the LYTC protocol is not vulnerable to pre-emptive unbinding.
Before discussing how this impacts other BSW protocols in Section ??, we first present a pre-emptive unbinding attack on a recently published protocol.
A PRE-EMPTIVE UNBINDING ATTACK ON THE HU-ZHANG (HZ) PROTOCOL
Lei et al. included one-time key pairs to prevent preemptive unbinding. In this section we shall identify, for the first time, a pre-emptive unbinding attack on the Hu-Zhang (HZ) protocol due to the omission of one-time key pairs, as illustrated in Figure ? ?.
Hu-Zhang (HZ) Protocol
In (?) a protocol was proposed aiming to increase the efficiency of multiple transactions. The trusted third party is not required to be online during a transaction between the buyer and the seller. As such the HZ protocol is subject to two phases, similar to the MW protocol: the watermark generation phase; and the watermark insertion phase. In the watermark generation phase, Hu and Zhang propose the novel idea of enabling the buyer to request multiple signed encrypted well-formed watermarks at once. Upon receipt of the buyers digital certificate C sk ca (b, pk b ) and the quantity n of watermarks required, the trusted third party randomly generates n unique watermarks w 1 , w 2 , . . .w n ∈ W M. Each is encrypted using the public key pk b of the buyer and signed, along with the same public key. Thus for each watermark w i a message E pk b (w i ), S sk t (pk b , E pk b (w i )) is sent from the trusted third party to the buyer along with certification of the buyer's public key.
In the watermark insertion phase the buyer chooses which watermark from the generation phase to use for the current transaction. The buyer sends to the seller a common agreement, along with a signature used to bind the watermark to the cover material, in the message arg, S sk b (E pk b (w), arg) . This is sent with messages m w and m b , received in the watermark generation phase. The seller verifies the signatures and embeds the watermark in the encrypted domain, sending the result E pk b (W wk s (c, w) ) to the buyer.
A Pre-emptive Unbinding Attack
One-time key pairs are not used in (?) and no alternative mechanism for preventing pre-emptive unbinding is provided, which leads to the following attack:-Upon completing a transaction in which they purchase the content C + with watermark W , the buyer B receives the encrypted watermarked content E pk B (W wk S (C + ,W )). During a second transaction, in which the B purchases less expensive content C − the seller S ignores the watermark received but instead embeds W received in the first transaction. Finally, the seller distributes the encrypted watermarked content E pk B (W wk S (C − ,W )).
Should the buyer share the less expensive content, S may extract W and embed it within the more expensive content C + . Thus evidence of illicit file sharing of C + (i.e., W wk S (C + ,W ), S sk B (E pk B (W ), arg(C + )) and S sk T (pk B , E pk B (W ))) can be obtained by the seller at a time when C + has not been shared.
This attack closely follows the pre-emptive unbinding attack on the MW protocol described in Section ??. It differs only in what constitutes sufficient evidence of file sharing. It demonstrates that signing a message to bind the watermark to the cover material does not alone prevent unbinding as a mechanism also needs to be adopted to avoid outdated information being used in subsequent transactions.
Any BSW protocol that fails to adopt a mechanism for avoiding pre-emptive unbinding is vulnerable to attack. It has been demonstrated in (?) and (?) that the protocol proposed in (?) is flawed, however it is also vulnerable to the pre-emptive unbinding attack described in this section.
ASSURING KEY PAIRS ARE USED ONLY ONCE
From the customers' right issue, Qiao and Nahrstedt observed that watermarking schemes in which the seller chose the watermark to be embedded failed to protect the copyright (? address this issue an arbitrator is unable to discern whether it is the buyer or seller that has acted maliciously. Thus, it is in the interest of a dishonest buyer to act in a manner that renders themselves vulnerable to an attack as they may as a consequence construct a plausible denial of the illicit file sharing they wish to perform. In (?), the protocol proposed in (?) was shown to be vulnerable to unbinding if the buyer leaves himself open to attack. The buyer can then share files without the seller being able to prove precisely which files were shared and escape prosecution. Although unbinding is only possible once a file is shared, the fabrication of evidence implies a failure to resolve the customers' rights issue.
As it is in the interest of the buyer for the protocol to fail to protect their rights, this implies it is in their interest to leave themselves vulnerable to unbinding. We demonstrated in Section ?? that the resolution of the customers' rights issue in (?) is dependent upon the uniqueness one-time key pairs. An unbinding attack is possible on the LYTC protocol should the same key pair be used in multiple transactions. A similar vulnerability in (?) was presented in (?) As preventing pre-emptive unbinding is dependent upon the uniqueness of the one-time key pairs it is apparent that entrusting the random generation of one-time key pairs to the buyer puts the protocol's security at risk.
A natural choice of whom ensures the uniqueness of key pairs thus becomes the seller. The digital certificate C sk b (pk b * ) must be checked against all other certificates used in previous transactions. Duplicate certificates must be rejected and the seller may later be required to prove this action to the arbiter. These may not be trivial tasks if the protocol is deployed on a large scale e-commerce system in which a great number of certificates must be stored and cross referenced in each transaction.
CONCLUSIONS
One time key pairs are the mechanism adopted by Lei et al. to avoid pre-emptive unbinding attacks in which the seller gains an advantage by taking action that preempts the file being shared. We have demonstrated that the omission of one time key-pairs from a BSW protocol leaves it vulnerable to a pre-emptive unbinding attack. This led to our discovery of an attack on the recently published HZ protocol that had not previously been identified, as described in Section ??.
In Section ?? we justified why the buyer must not be left to ensure that a unique key pair is used in each transaction as it is in their interest to use duplicates. We therefore conclude that the seller must verify the uniqueness of key pairs unless such action becomes unmanageable wherein an alternative approach to assuring key uniqueness must be proposed.
